Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of unskilled workers' earnings on crime. We create indexes of skill-biased technological change which vary by state and year, or by state, year, and industry. These indexes are used as instruments for earnings in crime regressions. We analyze US state panels, and also run structural crime equations using micro panel data from NLSY97. Estimated elasticities are markedly larger than those obtained by previous studies. Considering technology being adopted at the regional level does not alter the results appreciably. We also find evidence for asymmetric impact of unskilled workers' earnings on crime.
Introduction
Crime control is a major public policy concern because of its substantial social costs (Anderson, 1999) . While legal sanctions related to the certainty and severity of punishment are effective ways to control crime (Draca et al., 2011; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004; Corman and Mocan, 2000) , other factors, such as labor market opportunities, are also potentially important determinants of criminal activity. The extent to which legal earnings have an impact on crime is important for public policy in terms of current optimal crime control policy; but it is also important as current criminal activity is shown to impact future crime .
The relationship between legal market earnings and crime is well determined theoretically since the pioneering work of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) ; and their recent extensions (e.g. Mocan et al., 2005) . Although there exist studies on the influence of wages on crime (Corman and Mocan, 2005; Machin and Meghir, 2004; Gould et al., 2002) much of the empirical work has struggled with the difficulty of credibly identifying the impact of wages on crime. Specifically, the endogeneity of legal labor market earnings is a major empirical challenge, and it has been a difficult task to disentangle the causal impact of earnings on crime from the impact of unobservable factors that are correlated with both earnings and crime.
This paper analyzes the impact of unskilled workers' earnings on criminal propensity by making use of the findings of the research on wage inequality and skill-biased technological change. A number of influential papers have documented the rapid growth in wage inequality in the United States since the late 1970s (Autor et al., 2008; Katz and Autor, 1999; Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992) . It has been argued that the adoption of new technologies is positively correlated with the relative demand for skilled workers (Doms et al., 1997; Autor et al., 1998) , and the common view in the literature is that technological change and the resultant increase in the demand for skills have been major determinants of the rise in wage inequality (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) . 1 We investigate the extent to which variations in unskilled workers' earnings, induced by skill-biased technological change, cause crime. Following the literature on wage inequality, we create a theoretically well-defined construct of skill-biased technological change, and employ this measure as an instrument for unskilled workers' earnings in crime regressions. This is the same procedure as in Mocan et al. (2005) , who used this instrument to estimate the causal impact of mothers' earnings on child health outcomes and the use of health inputs. In addition to analyzing an annual state panel spanning 1983 to 2005, we also analyze, for the first time in this literature, a micro panel data set from NLSY97 covering the years 1997 to 2003 while employing an instrumental variable.
Results from state panels show that weekly earnings of unskilled workers have a significant impact on property crime with an elasticity of -1.0. Violent crime is not influenced by unskilled workers' earnings. We also find that the impact of earnings on crime is asymmetric. That is, a decline in real weekly earnings of unskilled workers has a larger impact on crime than an equivalent increase in their earnings. We show that the OLS regressions, which do not account for endogenity of wages, find the opposite result that an increase in wages prompts an increase in crime.
Using the NLSY97 panel, we find that wages impact the propensity to commit a variety of crimes ranging from theft to selling drugs, and that the elasticities are substantially higher than previous estimates. Specifically, the estimated elasticities are in the neighborhood of -2, indicating that movements in unskilled workers' earnings are more significantly related to criminal activity than recognized before. The asymmetric impact of wages on crime is also detected in micro data. While variations in men's wages impact men's criminal activity, women's wages have no significant influence on their propensity to commit crime.
We also consider the possibility that technology is determined at the regional level, rather than at the state level. We use census divisions as the geographical area in which technology is determined and then adopted by the states that encompass those regions. This procedure minimizes the concern that technology could be endogenous at the state level, driven by local labor market conditions. Using this procedure we create skill-biased technological change indicators for each of the nine census divisions for each year and then use them as instruments for low-skilled workers' wages in the corresponding states. The results do not change appreciably.
The next section of the paper briefly describes the previous research on wages and crime, and puts the contribution of this paper in perspective. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical framework. Section 4 presents the aggregate crime equation and the asymmetry hypothesis. Section 5 explains the instrument -skill biased technological change-that is employed in the paper. Section 6 describes the data used in the aggregate (state panels) analysis, and Section 7 displays the results obtained from aggregate data. Section 8 describes the econometric setup of the analysis of micro data, Section 9 explains the data sets used in this analysis. Section 10 presents the results obtained from micro data, Section 11 discusses the results obtained from the models that use the region-level skill-biased technology index, and Section 12 is the conclusion.
Previous research and the contribution of this paper
Although economic models of crime predict that legal market opportunities are negatively related to criminal activity, identification of the impact of labor market conditions on crime has been a challenge because of empirical difficulties. This is especially true for the impact of wages on crime due to endogeneity of wages. In micro data an individual's market wage and his/her unobserved proclivity for criminal activity are likely to be correlated. More specifically, an individual may command low wages in the labor market and at the same time he may have high propensity to engage in criminal activity. But this correlation does not imply a cause-and-effect relationship between wages and criminal activity, because it may be driven by a number of difficult-to-observe characteristics of the individual.
Criminal activity will also impact the relevant wages of the individual because participation in the criminal sector deteriorates legal human capital . These endogeneity and reverse causality issues produce biased estimates if such confounding is not carefully addressed. Grogger (1998) tackles these issues by estimating a reduced form model using cross-sectional data from one year (1980) of NLSY79 to explain the impact of wages on income from property crime. The estimated coefficients of the model are used in GMM to obtain the structural parameters, which generate a wage elasticity of crime participation of -1.0. An alternative strategy is to use aggregate crime data and to employ aggregate indicators of labor market opportunities under the assumption that they are reasonably exogenous to crime. For example, Machin and Meghir (2004) use average area wages to explain area-level crime rates in England and Wales. Gould et al. (2002) employ residuals of a state-level wage regression for males to explain county-level crime rates. OLS regressions provide wage elasticity estimates for property crime, which are about -0.9 in the former paper, and about -0.5 in the latter.
Exogeneity of wages, however, is questionable even in aggregate data. For example, unobserved attributes of a state may impact legal labor market wages as well as criminal activity. Furthermore, as implied by the results of Cullen and Levitt (1999) , reverse causality from crime rates to market wages is possible. 2 Thus, it is desirable to find an instrument that is correlated with wages at the local level, but not related to crime.
It has been a major challenge to find a convincing and uncomplicated instrument, even in aggregate data. For example, in addition to their OLS specifications, Gould et al. (2002) run instrumental variables regressions of county-level crime rates on state-level wages, where the instrument for state wages consists of the product of three elements: the industrial composition of the state in the beginning of the sample year, the national industrial composition trends in employment in each industry and the change in demographic composition in each industry at the 2 There is arguably no reverse causality from the crime rates to the minimum wages because the adjustments to minimum wages are determined largely by political, rather than economic factors, at least in the US. Hashimoto (1987) employ aggregate US time series data and use arrests as a proxy for crime in analyzing the impact of minimum wages on crime. Corman and Mocan (2005) use monthly time series data from New York City to investigate the impact of economic conditions, including the minimum wage and deterrence measures on crime. However, unobserved local characteristics may be correlated both with the level of minimum wages and the crime propensity. Hansen and Machin (2002) analyze the impact of a national minimum wage increase in the UK in 1999 by exploiting regional difference in crime rates and in the proportion of low-paid workers. national level. The wage elasticity obtained from this instrument is about -1.1 for property crimes.
There are only a handful of crime studies that employ panel data on individuals, but these studies investigate the impact of the local unemployment rate, rather than individual wages. 3 Furthermore, there is no crime study that employs an instrumental variables strategy using individual-level data.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, closely following the literature on wage inequality, it creates a straightforward and theoretically well-defined instrument for the earnings of unskilled workers and employs it to identify the effect of wages on crime (Mocan et al., 2015) . Second, this is the first paper to employ an individual-level panel data and an instrumental variables strategy to investigate the impact of unskilled workers' wages on crime. Specifically, it employs NLSY97 to analyze the behavior of young, unskilled workers, in addition to using more standard state-level panel data. The wage elasticities obtained using our instrument on micro panel data are substantially larger than previous estimates reported in the literature. 4 Third, it investigates, in both data sets, whether a decrease in earnings of unskilled workers has a larger impact on criminal propensity than an equivalent increase in earnings.
Theoretical framework
Standard theoretical models developed by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) postulate that optimizing individuals evaluate the expected monetary costs and benefits of participating in the legal labor market and in the market for offenses. Individuals also form expectations about the certainty and severity of punishment and make decisions on their criminal activity and on labor supply to the Mocan and Bali (2010) employ more than 27,000 individuals in the same data, and focus on the impact of the unemployment rate. A number of studies investigated the impact of unemployment on crime using instruments for the unemployment rate in aggregate panel data (e.g. panel of states -Lin, 2008; Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001 ; or panel of municipalities- Öster and Agell (2007) ). The typical instrument in these papers consists of an interaction of two or more variables, such as the interaction of the initial sectoral composition of employment in each aggregate unit with the national composition trends in employment (Öster and Agell, 2007) , the interaction of the share of manufacturing employment in the aggregate unit and the change in the relative price of crude oil, or the interaction of the change in real exchange rates with the share of the state manufacturing employment, or the state union membership in the aggregate unit (Lin, 2008) . 4 Gould et al. (2002) and Grogger (1998) used NLSY79, but they could only use data from one year (1980); so they ran cross-sectional regressions. legal market. In this framework, as the return to legal human capital (wages in the legal labor market) goes up, the propensity to engage in crime goes down. This basic insight can be demonstrated using the simple static model of Grogger (1998) who follows Gronau (1977) , where the individual maximizes a utility function U(C, L), where C stands for consumption and L is leisure time devoted to non-market activity. 5 Total available time T is spent between leisure, the amount of time allocated to the legal labor market T m , and the amount of time devoted to crime, T c , such that T =L + T m + T c . The budget constraint of the individual is C=Y+WT m +R(T c ), where Y stands for unearned income, W represents wages faced by the individual in the legal labor market, and R is the returns-to-crime schedule, which is a concave function of T c . The concavity represents the diminishing marginal returns to crime.
As detailed in Grogger (1998) , the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure is MRS(
where T m and T c are choice variables. If W 0 stands for the reservation wage of the individual, he will work in the labor market if W > W 0 . Similarly, he will commit crime if R ′ (T c ) = ∂R/∂T c > W 0 . An individual who allocates time to both crime and the labor market finds the optimal crime hours where marginal return to an extra hour of crime is equal to the market wage; i.e. where R ′ (T c ) = W is satisfied. 6 It is straightforward to show that a decrease in legal wages W increases the individuals' optimal allocation of time to crime. The basic theoretical framework described above allows us to estimate a crime participation equation using micro data, the details of which are presented in Sections 8-10. It also provides guidance for an aggregate (state-level) crime equation, which is discussed in the next section.
Analysis of aggregate data
The theoretical framework described in the previous section suggests a formulation as depicted by eq. (1) below
5 Recent dynamic economic models propose a richer interplay between investment in human capital and crime Lochner, 2004) , but the main insight regarding the impact of returns to human capital is the same. 6 The expected costs of crime, such as those associated with the certainty and severity of punishment, can be thought of as having been incorporated into the shape of the returns-to-crime schedule R(T c ).
where CR stands for the extent of criminal activity, W represent the relevant market wages, X is a vector of variables including unearned income and other attributes that may be correlated with tastes and contextual influences, and D stands for measures of deterrence variables that may capture the cost of crime. Within this framework and following the literature that employs aggregate crime data (Corman and Mocan, 2000; Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; Gould et al., 2002) , we estimate the following model As shown by Mocan et al. (2005) and Mocan and Bali (2010) , the impact of economic conditions on crime is expected to by asymmetric. A decline in economic opportunity (decline in market wages or increase in the unemployment rate) increases criminal propensity. As participation in crime goes up, legal human capital depreciates and criminal human capital appreciates. This makes it difficult to reduce the extent of criminal activity following the improvement in labor market conditions. Thus, the impact of a deterioration in real weekly earnings on crime is expected to be larger in magnitude than the impact of an increase in weekly earnings by the same absolute magnitude. To test this hypothesis we define the crime rate as an asymmetric function of weekly earnings (W), where the conditional mean of the crime rate is specified to follow two different paths depending on the change (increase or decrease) in W as follows
where
This specification allows us to investigate whether an increase in weekly earnings has the same impact on crime as a decrease in weekly earnings (i.e. whether " + c = " -c in eq. (3)). As described previously, it is obvious that labor market earnings are an endogenous variable in crime regressions when the unit of observation is the individual. Similar empirical difficulties exist in aggregate data. For example, unobserved attributes of a state may impact labor market wages as well as criminal activity. Because of these concerns, we employ an instrumental variables strategy, where the weekly wages of unskilled workers are instrumented by a measure of skill-biased technological change. Following the framework of Autor et al. (1998 Autor et al. ( , 2008 , we calculate an index of relative demand shifts favoring skilled workers, as detailed in the next section.
The instrument
Consider the following CES production function in which skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes. Total output, Y st , produced in state s in year t is given by
where H and L stand for efficiency-adjusted skilled and unskilled labor inputs (employment), respectively. A H and A L represent factor-augmenting technology terms. Variations of this production function have been widely used in similar contexts (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Acemoglu, 1998 Acemoglu, , 2002 Ciccone and Peri, 2005; Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Autor et al., 2008) . 7 The parameter 3 is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor and is assumed to be greater than unity. 
where K denotes capital stock, A K stands for capital-augmenting technology, and ! ∈ (0, 1) and ' ⩾ 0 are time invariant parameters. Assuming that markets are competitive, the first-order conditions still yield eq. (5).
supply of skills, H/L :
where W H and W L stand for efficiency-adjusted wages of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. 8 With data on wages and labor supply of both skilled and unskilled labor, A Hst /A Lst can be backed out for each state and year from eq. (5), given that 3 is known.
There is a large body of research that estimates the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor and the estimates are between 1.4 and 2. 9 In our analysis, we set 3 = 1.6 which is consistent with more recent estimates (e.g., Autor et al., 2008) . As eq. (5) depicts, 3 = 1.6 implies that a 10% increase in the relative supply of skilled labor should lower their relative wage by about 6.3% in the absence of technological change. The relative supply of skilled labor (i.e., college educated workers) has been rising over the last several decades in the US, but this rise has been accompanied by a well-documented increase in the relative wages of these workers. These facts imply that, as shown by eq. (5), A H /A L has been rising. Put differently, the observed increase in wage inequality in favor of skilled workers in the presence of the sustained increase in the relative supply of skill suggests an increase in A H /A L , which represents skill-biased technological change.
We employ ln(A H /A L ) as an index for skill-biased technological change (Autor et al., 1998 (Autor et al., , 2008 Goldin and Katz, 2007) . 10 Following Mocan et al. (2015) , we use this index of state-and-year specific (or alternatively, region-year specific, as 8 The creation of efficiency-adjusted H, L, W H and W L is described in the appendix to this paper, available on authors' web sites. 9 Using the CPS data over 1963-87, Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate that 3 is about 1.4. Autor et al. (2008) extend the period to 2005, and find the elasticity to be around 1.6. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) employ data until 2009, and report that 3 is about 1.6. Using state-level panel data from the 1950-1900 decennial censuses, Caselli and Coleman (2006) find this elasticity to be around 1.5. Thus, these studies suggest that 3 has been fairly stable over time. Based on extensive econometric estimates, Autor et al. (1998) conclude that this elasticity is unlikely to be greater than 2. 10 We use ln(A H /A L ) rather than ln(A H ) and ln(A L ), separately, for two reasons. First, ln(A H /A L ) directly measures skilled-biased technical change. Second, calculation of ln(A H ) and ln(A L ) requires the exact specification of the production function (Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Unel, 2010) (5), this does not imply that A H /A L is caused by wages. To be more specific, although our instrument ln(A H /A L ) is derived from state-level wages of skilled and unskilled workers as well as the labor supplies of these two groups, this does not jeopardize its validity as an instrument for lowskill wages. This is because causality runs theoretically from A H /A L to wages, and not the other way around, as emphasized by the large literature on the impact of skill-biased technical change on wages (e.g. Goldin and Katz, 2007; Autor et al., 2008) .
Although a change in ln(A H /A L ) can arise for a variety of reasons, ranging from variations in the relative prices of non-labor inputs to the evolution of labor market institutions, the consensus in the literature is that the primary driver of ln(A H /A L ) is skill-biased technological change (Autor et al., 2008; Goldin and Katz, 2007) . 12 A related point is whether skill-biased technological change and the resultant change in the relative demand for skilled workers would induce a policy reaction, which would render our instrument invalid. For example, if state governments increase minimum wages in reaction to a change in technology favoring skilled workers, the instrument would be invalid to the extent that the minimum wage has a direct impact on crime. However, the scenario that states increase the level of minimum wages in response to technology shocks does not seem realistic because minimum wages are not adjusted frequently. Between 1980 and 2005 there were six increases in the minimum wage mandated by the federal 11 It has been suggested that the rise in earnings inequality in the early 1980s was an episodic event, mostly driven by the decline in the real minimum wage (Card and Dinardo, 2002) . On the other hand, Autor et al. (2008) find limited support for this claim. They argue that the pattern of wage inequality between 1963 and 2005 is explained by a modified version of the skill-biased technological change hypothesis. 12 Minimum wage is an example of an institutional factor tat may have impacted the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor. Although Lee (1999) argues that minimum wage can account for the rise in the inequality in the lower tail of the wage distribution, Autor et al. (2016) find that the impact of minimum wage on overall wage inequality is modest, and it is almost negligible for males.
government, but the average number of state-induced increases was 3.5 during the same period. Running a regression of the logarithm of state minimum wages (the greater of the federal or the state) on state-level ln(A H /A L ) by controlling for state and time fixed-effects produced a coefficient of 0.001 with a p-value of 0.87. 13 This indicates that minimum wage is not impacted by variations in skill-biased technology shocks.
It is possible that states react to technology shocks that create a labor market disadvantage for unskilled workers in ways that are more subtle than minimum wage increases. We consider two types of state welfare expenditures and investigate whether states alter these expenditures in reaction to changes in the skill-biased technology index. The first expenditure item, welfare cash spending, measures cash assistance to individuals. It includes all state expenditures on cash programs as well as AFDC/TANF and assistance programs not under federal categorical programs (e.g., general assistance, refugee assistance, home relief, and emergency relief). The second variable, non-cash welfare, includes medical vendor payment benefits to individuals through Medicaid, state children's health insurance program (SCHIP), administration of medical and cash assistance, general relief, vendor, nursing homes and welfare institutions owned and operated by a government. 14 Thus the welfare expenditure measures include the amount contributed by the state and federal matches. Running a regression of the logarithm of real welfare cash spending on ln(A H /A L ) produces a coefficient of -0.09 with a p-value of 0.29, and the estimated coefficient is 0.02 (p=0.45) when the logarithm of real non-cash welfare spending is the dependent variable. 15 These results indicate that states do not react in systematic ways to increase the minimum wage or the welfare spending in order to counteract the potentially adverse effects on unskilled workers produced by shocks in skill-biased technology. This could be because state governors and state legislature cannot easily 13 Minimum wage is the greater of the federal and state minimum wage in a year. It is obtained from documents found at state departments of labor websites, the Monthly Labor Review publication of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, or from other official government documents. The time period of the regression, 1983-2005, is the same as the period covered by the state panel analyzed in section analyzed in the next two sections. Variations in this specification in various ways did not change neither the point estimate nor the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient of ln(A H /A L ). 14 These data are obtained from US Census Bureau,Annual Survey of State Government Finances and Census Government. 15 As in the case with the minimum wage regression, these models contain state and time fixed effects. Neither the estimated coefficient, nor statistical significance changed appreciably when the specification was altered by, for example, by adding state-specific trends, or by adding lagged values of the index of skill-biased technology. recognize these shocks, or alternatively, they may not worry about the impact of these shocks on unskilled workers. 16 If skill-biased technological change has a direct impact on crime, our exclusion restriction would be invalid. While skill-biased technological change has an impact on earnings of low-skilled workers, it also influences the dispersion of earnings. To analyze the extent to which skill-biased technological change has a secondary impact on crime through the dispersion of earnings, we calculate the standard deviation in weekly earnings for each state and year using the CPS data, and use it as a control variable in crime regressions. As we report in the results section, controlling for the state-level dispersion in earnings has no impact on the results, increasing our confidence in the exclusion restriction.
When we analyze micro data from the NLSY97, we follow the same procedure to create the instrument, with one difference. We generate state-year-and-industry specific measures of relative demand shifts ( A Hjst /A Ljst ,) in each state s, year t, and for three broad industry categories (service, manufacturing, and other industries) j. These measures are matched with workers in the NLSY by the industry of employment. Those who are unemployed are matched with statewide skill-biased technological change for each year. The details of the micro data analysis are presented in Section 8 and the details of the creation of skill-biased technological change measure are available on authors' web sites.
Although technology is clearly exogenous at the national level, one can argue that technological change at the state level could be endogenous and it could in part be determined by state's labor market conditions. To address this concern we consider the case that technology is assumed to be determined at the regional level, rather than the state level. We use the nine census divisions (New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain and Pacific) as the relevant geographical area in which "regional" technology is determined. We obtain skillbiased technological change indicators at the census division level for each year and for the three broad industry categories and attribute these indices to each state that is part of the relevant census division. In this procedure all workers in a particular census division are exposed to the same skill-biased technological change in their broad industry group; that is, regional technological change is used as an instrument low-skill wages. The results do not change appreciably although the estimated standard errors get larger in some cases.
Data used in state panel
We follow the literature on wage inequality to construct measures of earnings and employment for both skilled and unskilled labor (e.g. Autor et al., 2008) . Specifically, we use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1980 to 2006 that provide information on prior year's annual earnings and weeks worked. We focus on weekly earnings, which are constructed by dividing total annual earnings (from wages and salaries) in the previous year by the number of weeks worked. 17 Following Gould et al. (2002) , we construct average weekly earnings by considering all employed people between 16 and 64 years of age (excluding self-employed workers) and who work on a full-time basis (defined as working 35-plus hours per week). They are deflated by state-specific price deflators from Berry et al. (2000) . Consistent with our econometric specification and much of the literature, we classify non-college educated individuals (those with 12 or fewer years of schooling) as unskilled labor, and those with at least some college education (13 or more years) are classified as skilled workers. The online appendix provides a complete description of the data sets and construction of aggregate variables.
Uniform Crime Reports data, pertaining to specific FBI index crimes (burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, robbery, murder, rape and aggravated assault) are obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Arrests for each specific crime type are compiled from hardcopies of the uniform crime reports. To avoid ratio bias, arrest rates are calculated by deflating arrests by population, rather than by offenses. In this calculation we used the state population covered by police agencies reporting to the FBI, also obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports. The percentage of state population living in urban areas, percentage black, and percentage aged 15 to 24 are based on the Census information. Per capita personal disposable income in the state is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the unemployment rate data are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Per capita beer consumption (which is obtained from the National Institutes of Health) is used as a proxy for alcohol consumption in each state. The descriptive statistics of the data are provided in Table 1 . (2000), and Katz et al. (2003) , arrest rates are lagged once to minimize the impact of simultaneity between crime and deterrence.
The framework of the skill-biased technological change depicted by eqs (4) and (5) and the literature on wage inequality assume that wages are determined on inelastic relative supply of the skill groups (Autor et al., 1998 (Autor et al., , 2008 Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) . Deviations from full-employment are implicitly ruled out, but they can take place idiosyncratically because of cyclical conditions. This suggests that one can incorporate unemployment to this analysis as an exogenous variable as was done in the analysis of wage inequality (e.g. Autor et al., 2008) . Thus, models presented in Tables 2A and 2B include state unemployment rates, but dropping them has no effect on the magnitude or statistical significance of other coefficients.
Column (1) of Table 2A shows that the IV-estimate of the coefficient of unskilled (non-college) workers' weekly earnings is -9.2 in the total property crime regression and it is highly significant. The estimate indicates that a $20 increase in weekly real earnings of unskilled workers (which corresponds to a 5% increase at the sample mean) reduces property crime rate by 184 (or about 9,670 fewer property crimes in a state in a year), which corresponds to a 4.4% decline. This suggests an elasticity of property crime with respect to real weekly earnings of -0.9. Columns (2) and (3) show that an increase in weekly earnings of unskilled workers reduces two components of property crime: burglary and larceny, but it has no impact on motor-vehicle theft. A $20 increase in weekly earnings of unskilled workers generates a decline in the burglary rate by about 56, or 6%, which translates into 3,160 fewer burglaries. The same increase in earnings brings about a decline in the larceny rate by 150 (5.4%). This suggests that the elasticity of burglary and larceny with respect to earnings of unskilled workers is Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. The dependent variable for each regression is the crime rate per 100,000 state population covered by the police agencies that report to FBI. Arrest rate is calculated as the number of arrests per 1,000 population. Alcohol consumption is volume of beer consumption (in 1,000 gallons) per 100,000 population. The regression also includes percent urban population, state and time fixed-effects, and a common time-trend. Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. The dependent variable for each regression is the crime rate per 100,000 state population covered by the police agencies that report to FBI. Arrest rate is calculated as the number of arrests per 1,000 population. Alcohol consumption is volume of beer consumption (in 1,000 gallons) per 100,000 population. The regression also includes percent urban population, state and time fixed-effects, and a common time-trend.
in the range of -1.1 to -1.2. The coefficient of unskilled workers' earnings is not significantly different from zero in any violent crime category. This is true even for robbery. Although robbery is associated with monetary gain, it is a violent crime as it involves the use of a weapon, and our results show that no violent crime category (murder, rape, robbery, assault) is impacted by weekly earnings. Table 2A also shows that state alcohol consumption is positively related to crime and that the arrest rate has a negative impact on most crimes and the impact is estimated with precision in case of burglary, larceny, and total property crime. Lagging the arrest rate twice or omitting it from the models did not alter the estimated coefficients of weekly earnings. 19 Per capita state income has a negative impact on motor vehicle thefts and robberies. Table 2B shows that a decrease in unskilled workers' weekly earnings has a larger impact on total property crime than an increase in earnings by the same magnitude. That is, the coefficient of Weekly Earnings -is larger in absolute value than that of Weekly Earnings + , and the difference is statistically different from zero at the five percent level. Specifically, if real weekly earnings of unskilled workers go down by $10, the property crime rate goes up by about 184, which corresponds to an increase in the number of property crimes by about 9,700. 21 On the other hand, if weekly earnings increase by $10, the property crime rate goes down by only 173, which translates into a decline in the number of property crimes by 9,120. The same asymmetry is detected in the impact of weekly earnings of unskilled workers on burglary and larceny. In both cases, a decline in real weekly earnings has a larger impact on criminal activity than an increase in weekly earnings by the same magnitude. The difference in the effects is statistically different from zero at the 8-percent level for burglary, and at the 2-percent level for larceny.
19 In models that omitted the deterrence variables, estimated coefficients of weekly earnings were larger in absolute value in most cases. 20 The first stage regressions are not identical between specifications because each crime type regression (burglary, larceny, etc.) has its own specific arrest rate as part of the explanatory variables. An increase in the unemployment rate increases robberies, which is a violent crime that has a monetary motive. The estimated coefficients in Table 2A and 2B imply that a one-percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate increases property crime rate by 72-108, which translates into an increase in property crimes by about 2 percent. This magnitude is remarkably similar to the ones reported by previous research (Freeman and Rodgers, 2000; Gould et al., 2002; Corman and Mocan, 2005) . The same one-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate generates a 3.8 percent increase in robberies.
As described in Section 5, skill-biased technological has also an impact on the dispersion of earnings. To analyze the extent to which the impact of skillbiased technological change on crime is driven by the dispersion in earnings, we calculated the standard deviation in weekly earnings for each state and year using the CPS data, and added this variable to the crime regressions as a control variable. Neither the magnitudes nor the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of weekly earnings are impacted appreciably. 22 Very similar results to those reported in Tables 2A-2B are obtained when composition-adjusted (instead of efficiency-adjusted) wages and the corresponding skill-biased technology measure are used in regressions. 23 Estimating the models using OLS, by treating the weekly earnings of unskilled workers as exogenous, provides estimates of earnings that are mostly positive and sometimes statistically different from zero. Selected coefficients from OLS regressions are displayed in Table 3 . On its face, these OLS results would suggest that an increase in weekly earnings of non-college workers would increase crime; thus they underline the importance of addressing the endogeneity of wages.
Analysis of micro data
Based on the theoretical framework summarized in Section 3 above, and following Grogger (1998) , in this section we estimate a structural crime participation 22 For example, the coefficient of weekly earnings in total property crime regression is estimated as -7.12 (p=0.01), while it is -9.23 in Table 2A . Similarly, in the burglary regression that included the standard deviation of earnings the coefficient of low-skilled earnings is -2.09 (p=0.04) while it is -2.84 in Table 2A . The coefficient of larceny is -5.57 (p=0.001) when the regression contained the standard deviation of weekly earnings, while it is -7.66 in Table 2A . The results indicate that controlling for the dispersion of earnings has no significant influence on the estimated impact of low-skilled earnings on crime. 23 See the online appendix for the details of composition-adjusted wages. Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. The dependent variable for each regression is the crime rate per 100,000 state population covered by the police agencies that report to FBI. Arrest rate is calculated as the number of arrests per 1,000 population. Alcohol consumption is volume of beer consumption (in 1,000 gallons) per 100,000 population. The regression also includes percent urban population, state and time fixed-effects, and a common time-trend. equation using data from NLSY97. Specifically, consider the following equations: The subscripts are suppressed for simplicity. The variables X and D stand for the vector of personal attributes and state characteristics, including deterrence. As described in Section 3, if the person is engaged in crime, it should be the case that R ′ (T c = 0) > ln W. This indicates that the probability of committing crime, Pr(CR = 1), can be depicted as Pr(CR = 1) = Pr(
Equation (7) can be estimated by maximum likelihood probit, but two complications exist. First, market wages W are not observed for those who don't work in the labor market, and estimating eq. (7) using only those who work could produce sample selection bias. Second, % and , in eqs (6a) and (6b) are likely to be correlated. That is, unobserved factors that influence labor market productivity may be correlated with unobservables that impact productivity in the criminal sector, which constitutes a potential source of endogeneity of wages. To address the first issue, we specify a selection equation that classifies individuals into worker vs. non-worker groups and estimates it along with the wage equation using full maximum likelihood. Identification is achieved by including unearned income in the selection equation and excluding it from the wage equation. Alternative identification restrictions, such as including indicators of marijuana use and gun ownership in addition to household income, provide the same results. This selectivity-corrected wage equation is used to impute the market wages of non-workers.
To address the endogeneity of wages, we instrument wages with skill-biased technological change index as explained in Section 5. Because each worker's sector of work is known in the data, we classify workers into three groups as working in the service sector, in the manufacturing sector, or in other sectors (which consists of agriculture, mining and construction). We calculate the index of skillbiased technology for each state, year, and sector using the algorithm described in the online appendix. More specifically, we specify production functions for the manufacturing sector, service sector and the residual (all other) sectors which depend on skilled and unskilled labor as before, and recover the index for the skill-biased technology using eq. (5).
We then match each worker in each state, year and sector with the corresponding sector-state-and year specific skill-biased technology index. Because the sector affiliation is unknown for non-workers, we matched them by year, with the state-and-year specific skill-biased technology index (the index that was used in the state-panel analysis earlier). In this framework we estimate 
Micro data from the NLSY97
We use confidential geo-coded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort (NLSY97). The main data set is constructed using information from the 1997-2003 waves of the NLSY97, which contains a nationally representative sample of 8,984 youths. The individuals in the sample were aged 12 to 16 as of December 31, 1996, indicating that the sample consists of young and unskilled (low educated) people, with average age of about 18 (see Table 4 ). The respondents have been followed annually since the survey was initiated. We limit the sample to the 1997-2003 waves because everyone who took the survey between these years was asked questions on criminal activity. After 2003 crime questions were asked to those who had reported to have been arrested in previous waves in addition to a small group of not-arrested respondents. We employ seven different indicators of delinquency. They are robbery, which is a violent crime, and six categories of property crimes such as whether the person committed burglary, whether he/she stole a car, whether he/she sold or helped selling hard drugs like cocaine, and whether he/she sold any drugs. Other crime measures include stealing a purse, a wallet, or stealing something from a store (larceny); and whether the person received, possessed or sold stolen property, committed embezzlement and fraud. This last category is called Stolen Property. We also employ a variable to indicate if the person committed Larceny, Car Theft or Robbery. 24 In each wave, individuals are asked about the jobs they have taken since the last interview. Respondents report up to 11 different jobs as well as the hourly compensation they have received in each job. Highest hourly compensation reported for the year is used as the relevant wage. To eliminate outliers, observations above the 95 th percentile of the wage distribution are omitted. Finally, the wage rate is deflated by the state-level CPI.
Some of the individuals in our sample reported that they have not worked since the date of last interview. Their market wages are predicted by estimating a labor force participation equation jointly with a market wage equation. The exclusion restriction for the selection equation is to omit conventional non-labor income from the wage equation. Non-labor income is defined as the difference between individual's total household income and his/her personal labor income. As a result, our non-labor income measure includes the following income types: child support, interest from bank accounts, dividends from stocks or mutual funds, rental income, income received from the parents, and from other sources (except own farms/businesses or salaries).
NLSY97 includes information about the industry classifications of individuals' jobs. We used the 2002 Census definitions of the industries. 25 After matching individuals with their industries, we used the technology shocks as an instrumental variable. Obviously, those individuals who reported not having worked since the date of the last interview do not belong to an industry. Consequently, we modified our instrumental variable such that non-working people are matched with the overall technology shocks.
Individual control variables include whether the person has carried a gun in the last year, the individual's age, an indicator for whether the individual has at least a high school degree (including GED), individual's household income (income from all sources in the family), household size, indicators for marital status, the number of biological children of the individual (regardless of whether 24 These outcome variables are constructed based on a series of questions in the following form "Have you done X since the last interview?" where X stands for various crimes mentioned in the text. From 1998-2003 all crime questions were asked in that form. In the first wave in 1997, the question was "Have you ever done X?" followed by "How many times have you committed X in the last 12 months?" or "How old were you when you last did X?" Thus, we used these variables to construct the outcome variables for the first wave. 25 The Census Bureau has reclassified some of the jobs in 2002. We utilized this new classification. they live in individual's household), an indicator for whether the individual lives in an urban area, and the number of days in the last month the individual has consumed more than 5 alcoholic beverages and used marijuana. 26 In addition, we use state level control variables. They consist of per capita personal income in individual's state, share of the population aged between fifteen and twenty four and share of the population that is black in the state.
County-level arrest data are obtained from Uniform Crime Reporting Program (County-Level Detailed Arrest and Offense Data sets for years between 1997 and 2004). These data provide the number of juvenile and adult arrests in each county for several crime categories including the Index I crimes and minor crimes such as drug sale, fraud, embezzlement, vandalism and so on. Using the population of each county, we calculated per capita (times 100,000) adult and juvenile arrests for motor vehicle theft, robbery, larceny, and burglary. For hard drugs, we used the arrests pertaining to the sale and manufacturing of cocaine and opium; and for any drug we used the arrests pertaining to the sale and manufacturing of any narcotics. For Other Property Crime, we used the arrest rates for forgery, fraud, embezzlement and buying/receiving/possessing stolen property. For Any Property Crime, we used the sum of the property crime arrests and robbery arrests. We matched the individuals in our sample with the relevant arrest rates by their county and according to the crime they have committed and whether they are older or younger than 18 years of age. For example, somebody who is younger than 18 is matched with juvenile arrest rates, and those who are eighteen or older are matched with the adult arrest rates in the county. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics. The regressions include the individuals who have contributed at least two observations to the sample. The reported descriptive statistics pertain to our largest sample -regressions reported in column (1) of Table 5A. 27 26 Urban classification has been changed in 2003 by the NLSY (because the Census classification was changed in 2000). We employed the definition as reported in the NLSY. 27 The means of the county level arrest rates are smaller in comparison to the means of the state level arrest rates (reported in Table 1 ). This is because of three reasons. First, the sample includes individuals from small counties in which there are very few arrests for some crime types. This pulls the sample average down. Second, when calculating the arrest rates, we deflated the total number of arrests for each specific crime for both juveniles and adults with the total number of people in the jurisdiction covered by the agencies in the county. In other words, in calculating the juvenile (adult) arrest rate for, say, larceny, we divide the number of juvenile (adult) larceny arrests by total population. Ideally, we would use the number of juveniles in the county to calculate the juvenile arrest rates and the number of adults to calculate the adult arrest rates. However, such information is not provided by the FBI. As a result, although our measures of the county arrest rates are good proxies for juvenile and adult arrests, they are lower than their true value. Third, and most important, our sample is mostly made up of young individuals. The average age 10 Estimation results using micro data Table 5A presents the crime regressions that employ the NLSY97 data. Potential market wages of non-workers are imputed using the selection-corrected wage equation displayed in online appendix Table A -1, and wages are instrumented by state-year-sector specific skill-biased technology parameters. Because nonworkers' sector of work does not exist, we assigned them the state-and-year specific skill-biased technology index. The instrument is powerful with F-statistics in the range of 127-155. Real wages have no significant impact on robbery or burglary, 28 but they impact all other crime categories. The results indicate that a 1-percent increase in real wages decreases the propensity to steal something from a store or a purse or wallet (column 2) by 16 percentage points. The same increase in wages generates a decline in the propensity to steal a car by 4 percentage points. Similarly, an increase in wages has a negative impact on participating in other crimes (possession of stolen property, etc.), selling any drugs, as well as selling hard drugs. The implied elasticies are about -1.7 for most crime categories.
Arrests reduce criminal proclivity with statistically significant impacts in case of burglary, car theft, larceny, and the indicator that identifies whether the person committed larceny, robbery or car theft. Heavy drinking, marijuana use and carrying a gun are positively related to criminal activity. Drinking and smoking marijuana may depend on the individual's wage to the extent that the variation in the wage rate creates an income effect. In this case, drinking and consumption of marijuana should not be included as controls. Dropping these variables had no impact on the coefficients of other variables.
Table 5B displays the model which includes Wage + and Wage -as explanatory variables. Similar to the results obtained from state panels (see Table 2B ), the coefficients of Wage -are larger in absolute value than those of Wage + indicating that the impact on the propensity to commit crime of a given decrease in wages is larger than the increase in wages of the same magnitude. The difference in the coefficients of Wage + and Wage -is significantly different from zero in the models that explain selling hard drugs with a p-value of 0.02 (column 6), and where is below eighteen. Consequently, the juvenile arrest rate has a greater weight in the means reported in Table 4 . The juvenile arrests make up only a small portion of total arrests. For example, in 2004, only 16% of all arrests involved a juvenile in the US. Therefore, it is natural to have smaller means for the arrest rates in the individual level analysis. 28 Robbery is a violent crime, where the perpetrator takes or attempts to take something valuable from the victim by using a weapon or by the threat of violence. Burglary involves entering into a structure, such as a house, to commit theft. larceny/car theft/robbery is the dependent variable (column 1) with a p-value of 0.07.
The results obtained from estimating the models for men are presented in Table 6A and 6B. Wages have a negative and statistically significant impact on all crimes with the exception of robbery and burglary. Table 6B shows that the impact of Wage -is larger than that of Wage + as before, and that the difference in the impact is significantly different from zero in case of larceny/car theft/robbery (column 1) and selling hard drugs (column 6).
When we ran the models for females, the estimated wage coefficients were small and statistically not different from zero in any crime category. For example, the wage coefficient was -0.097 (std=0.084) in the larceny equation indicating that females' market wages have no significant impact on their propensity to steal a purse or a wallet, or to steal something from a store. 29 It should be noted this result could be because of low variation in the dependent variable (less criminal activity for females). Suggestive evidence for this is that the estimated coefficients are closer to being significant in case of larceny and larceny/car theft/robberycrime categories with higher participation rates. An increase in the minimum wage has a negative impact for females in case of property crimes other than car theft: larceny, and the joint category of larceny/car theft/robbery.
Instrument at the census division level
As explained in Section 5, it can be argued that our instrument, the indicator of state-level skill-biased technological change, might be influenced by the labor market conditions of the state. To address this concern, we assume that technology is determined/adopted at the regional level, rather than the state level. We use the nine census divisions (New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain and Pacific) as the relevant geographical area in which technology is determined. We calculate the weighted average of aggregate wage and employment by skill, gender, and experience at the census division level, and obtain skill-biased technological change indicators for each year and for the three broad industry categories (service, manufacturing, other). We assign these indices to each state that is part of the corresponding census division. In this procedure all Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. The dependent variable for each regression is the crime rate per 100,000 state population covered by the police agencies that report to FBI. Arrest rate is calculated as the number of arrests per 1,000 population. Alcohol consumption is volume of beer consumption (in 1,000 gallons) per 100,000 population. The regression also includes percent urban population, state and time fixed-effects, and a common time-trend. First-stage F-statistics for the excluded instrument in various crime regressions are around 13.
workers in a particular sector who live in a given census division are exposed to the same skill-biased technological change in that particular year. When we employ this regional skill-biased technological change as the instrument using the NLSY data, the F-values in the first-stage exceed 110. The results, which are not reported in the interest of space, are consistent with those reported earlier. We find that the impact of unskilled workers' wages on their criminal propensity is larger in comparison to Table 5A in case of larceny (-0.19) , it is smaller in case of car theft (-0.03) and stolen property (-0.06), and the same in case of selling hard drugs (-0.06).
We also estimated the state-level crime regressions using the regional skillbiased technological change as the instrument for state-level average wages of low-skilled workers. In this specification, we lose variation in the instrument because the instrument is calculated for nine census divisions and assigned to 50 states in each year. Consequently, the first stage regressions are not as powerful, with F-values of about 13; thus the estimated impact of wages is inflated. Nevertheless, the results in Table 7 show that, consistent with the state panel regressions that employ state-level technological change index as the instrument for low-skill earnings (Table 2A) , burglary, larceny and total property crime are impacted by weekly earnings of low-skill workers.
Conclusion
Although formal economic models of crime were developed almost five decades ago, empirical issues have created substantial obstacles regarding reliable inference about the magnitudes of the relationships between economic variables and criminal activity. Inconsistent estimates reported in the literature prompted some analysts to argue that there was little evidence to support the hypothesis that economic conditions impact crime and that there was a disconnect between theory and empirical evidence. In the analysis of the impact of market wages on crime truly exogenous variation in wages is difficult to find, and it has been a tough challenge to come up with convincing and functional instruments for wages that can be used in aggregate crime regressions. No study so far has employed an instrumental variables strategy in crime-wage regressions using micro data.
In this paper we investigate the impact of unskilled (non-college educated) workers' earnings on crime using both aggregate (state level) and micro (NLSY97) panel data sets. Using the framework employed in the literature on wage inequality and using CPS data, we create a state-and-year specific measure of skill-biased technological change. Following Mocan et al. (2015) , we use this measure as an instrument for unskilled workers' earnings.
Estimation of crime regressions using state panels demonstrates that a decrease in unskilled workers' real weekly earnings, induced by skilled-biased technological change, has a positive impact on state property crime with an elasticity of -1.0. Individual components of property crime, such as burglary and larceny, are also impacted by unskilled wages. Violent crime is not influenced by weekly earnings of unskilled workers. We detect asymmetry in the impact of unskilled workers earnings on crime. A deterioration in earnings has a larger effect on crime in magnitude in comparison to an increase in earnings by the same absolute amount.
We also employ micro data from the geo-coded confidential version of the NLSY97 to estimate models of criminal participation. The data set consists of young and mostly unskilled workers, spanning the years 1997-2003. The NLSY97 contains detailed measures of individuals' criminal activity as well as personal and household attributes and wages, along with information on participation in a variety of crimes, ranging from theft to selling drugs. Geo-codes allow us to identify the location of the individual and to merge them with age-specific (juvenile versus adult) arrest rates in their county of residence. For those who have not participated in the legal labor market, we impute wages by jointly estimating a labor force participation equation and a wage equation. We create stateyear-industry specific measures of skill-biased technological change for three broad industry categories (manufacturing, service, other) and match workers with the relevant skill-biased technological change indicators, by their industry. We instrument market wages with state-year-industry specific technology shocks and find wage elasticities in the neighborhood of -2, which is markedly larger than previous estimates. The asymmetric impact of wages on crime is also detected in micro data. Market wages have no significant impact on criminal activity of females. These findings, taken together, indicate that individual crime decisions respond to labor market incentives as predicted by theory, and that variations in unskilled workers's earnings have a significantly larger impact on criminal activity than recognized before.
